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THE SOUTHEASTERN WATER COMPACT, PANACEA OR
PANDORA'S Box? A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE
VIABILITY OF INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS
DAVID N. COPAS JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Chattahoochee River Basin is one of the most important water
resources in the Southeastern portion of the United States. The "Hooch," as
it is locally known, cuts a more than four-hundred-mile path from Northern
Georgia to its point of intersection with the Flint River on the border of
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Along the way, the river supplies Lake
Sidney Lanier, serves as a drinking water supply for Atlanta,2 and forms a
great portion of the border between Georgia and Alabama. Further, the
"Hooch" combines with the Flint River to form the Apalachiola River, which
flows through Northwest Florida before emptying into the Gulf of Mexico.
Increasing development of the Southeastern United States has taxed
heavily the region's water resources. Consequently, the conflict over the
Chattahoochee River has grown into a hotly contested battle.3 It has involved
not only the states themselves, but also the Federal Government in the form
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the agency in charge of the
Mr. Copas graduated Magna Cum Laude in International Relations from the University
of Pennsylvania in 1993, and expects to receive his J.D. from the College of William and
Mary School of Law in May of 1998.
See Carl Erhardt, The Battle Over "The Hooch:" The Federal-Interstate Water Compact
and the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200 n. 1
(1992) (citing Brief for Plaintiff, Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (N.D.
Ala. 1990) (No. CV-90-H-0133 1-E)).
2 The Chattahoochee River supplies 70% of Atlanta's drinking water. See id. at 201 n.7
(citing River Rivalry, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 26).
See River Rivalry, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 26 (discussing feud between Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia over rights to the Chattahoochee River).
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maintenance of Lake Lanier.' It is against this backdrop that this Note is
developed.
The purpose of this Note is to take various solutions to interstate
conflicts over water rights and analyze them in a law and economics
framework. Though many authors have argued that one solution to such
conflicts is superior to others, none have done so by applying law and
economics theories to the problem. By looking for a solution to interstate
water rights issues through the lens of law and economics analysis, it is
possible to look beyond political and social concerns which, though
important, should not override the requirement that laws reflect the most
efficient means of resource allocation. Under this framework, federal-
interstate water compacts emerge as the most logical choice for solving
interstate water conflicts.
This Note begins with a discussion of the various water rights regimes
employed by the states. A discussion of the law and economics theories
employed by the author constitutes Part III. Part IV reviews the
circumstances surrounding the current state of the conflict over the "Hooch,"
and discusses recent developments in the negotiating process between the
states and the federal government. Part IV also reviews the three main
solutions to questions of interstate water rights and examines how interstate
water compacts have been used in a variety of settings. Part V examines four
regional approaches to water rights. Finally, Part VI tests the federal
interstate compact solution under the law and economics theories examined
in Part III.
II. TRADITIONAL WATER RIGHTS REGIMES
Though the migratory nature of water makes defining property rights
difficult, three types of water rights regimes have been developed within the
See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, 33 U.S.C. § 603a (1994); Flood Control Act of
1941, 33 U.S.C. § 701c (1994); Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390b (1994); 33
C.F.R. § 222.7(a)-(d) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 222.7(0(9) (1994).
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United States to deal with the problem.5 The regime used by a particular state
has a great deal to do with the scarcity of water in that particular region.6
Furthermore, what is "owned" within these regimes is generally not the water
itself, but the fight to put that water to use.7 The East Coast, since colonial
times, has been governed primarily under riparianism.8 The western states,
on the other hand, employ some form of the prior appropriation system of
water usage.9 Additionally, in recent years several states have moved away
from pure riparianism, and have made use of some form of hybrid system."°
A. Riparian Rights
During the colonial period, and particularly during the early portions
of the Industrial Revolution, the colonies (and later the eastern states)
constructed water rights regimes based upon the traditional notions of
European water rights."' Blessed with an abundance of water resources, the
The three types of water rights regimes include the riparian doctrine, appropriation
doctrine, and hybrid systems.
6 See Deborah L. Freeman, Introduction, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE FIFTY STATES AND
TERRITORIES 1-3 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990) (comparing water rights doctrines utilized
in the humid east versus the arid west).
7 See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 28-29 (1984) (detailing nature of
riparian rights).
8 States using some form of riparian rights for surface water include: Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia. Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.
See Patricia K. Flood, Water Rights of the Fifty States and Territories, in WATER RIGHTS OF
THE FIFTY STATES AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 31, 35-69.
States using some form of an appropriation system include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming. See id.
10 States that use a combination system or other type of system include: California, Florida,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
" See Stuart L. Somach, Water Rights, in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW HANDBOOK 202,
203-04 (Government Institutes, Inc. 1991) (tracking evolution of riparian rights in the U.S.).
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eastern seaboard did not have to develop a strict method of water allocation. 2
The result was the riparian system of water rights. Simply stated, riparian
rights 3 are those that an owner of land has in the water flowing through a
watercourse 4 adjacent to the owner's land. 5
As development of the East Coast increased during the Industrial
Revolution and as industrial powers sought to use rivers and streams to
power their mills, new pressures on water resources developed. 6 Against this
backdrop two sub-doctrines of riparian rights developed. First is the "natural
flow doctrine,"' 7 which is based on the idea that the owner of property
adjacent to a watercourse is entitled to an undiminished portion of the
water.' 8 The term "undiminished" refers to both quantity and quality of the
water. 19
The second, and more important, sub-set of riparianism is the
"reasonable use" doctrine.2" Under this regime, riparian owners can make
any reasonable use of the water adjacent to their land, so long as it does not
2 See id.
Riparian rights only attach to surface watercourses. Ground water (including
subterranean streams) is not included in the riparian rights regime. See id. at 204-05.
"4 A water course is defined as a "running stream of water; a natural stream fed from
permanent or natural sources, including rivers, creeks, runs, and rivulets." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1592 (6th ed. 1990).
's See Somach, supra note 11, at 205.
'6 See James B. MacDonald, Riparian Doctrine, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE FIFTY STATES
AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 19, 20 (discussing the 1827 case of Tyler v. Wilkinson,
24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312)).
'" See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS AS THE
SAME IS FORMULATED AND APPLIED IN THE PACIFIC STATES, INCLUDING THE DOCTRINE OF
APPROPRIATION § 8 (Henry Campbell Black ed., 1887).
,8 See id.
'9 See id.
20 See id. § 125.
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affect adversely the rights of other proprietors along the watercourse.2 Tyler
v. Wilkinson2 laid the foundation for the doctrine in 1827:
When I speak of this common right, I do not mean to be
understood, as holding the doctrine, that there can be no
diminution whatsoever ... by a riparian proprietor, in the
use of water as it flows for that would be to deny any
valuable use of it .... The true test of the principle and
extent of the use is, whether it is to the injury of the other
proprietors or not.23
In effect, the "reasonable use" doctrine serves as one of the earliest
applications of law and economics theory. In Wilkinson, the court's concern
about protecting valuable uses illustrated an early interest in ensuring that
even a seemingly abundant resource be allocated to the most efficient uses.
Efficient uses were protected so long as those uses did not impinge on the
abilities of downstream users to make efficient use of the resource.
Apart from generalized recognition of the need for economic resource
allocation inherent in the "reasonable use" doctrine, riparian regimes have
one other advantage. Riparian systems require very little control from
centralized government, as they are, by and large, self-governing.24
Unfortunately, this advantage can serve as a disadvantage as well. The fact
that riparian rights are so generalized creates several problems, one of which
is uncertainty over rights.25 This uncertainty, in turn, leads to problems in
enforcement of such rights.2 6 Such ambiguity forces parties in a dispute to
turn to the most inefficient of all dispute resolution mechanisms-litigation.
21 See id.
22 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
23 Id. at 474.
24 See MacDonald, supra note 16, at 21 (stating that under riparianism there is no need for
a government agency to develop and enforce regulations).
25 See id.
26 See id. Further exacerbating this situation is an imprecise definition of what exactly
constitutes a "reasonable use;" see also WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 23 (2d ed. 1989).
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Finally, and most importantly, pure riparianism is no longer in tune
with the reality of water resources. Riparianism inherently was based on the
notion that supply is generally large enough to accommodate, at least, all
demands for reasonable uses. 27 Present reality simply does not permit such
an inference.28 Instead, increasing consumptive uses are pushing demand
closer to supply levels, if not beyond in some cases.29 Riparian states are
addressing slowly this problem by utilizing hybrid systems.
B. The Western Model: Prior Appropriation
The scarcity of water, coupled with the demands of extensive mining
concerns, forced the western portions of the United States to move away from
the riparian system. 3 What developed in its place was the prior appropriation
system, a regime based upon the economically beneficial use of water.3' The
three general requirements of the doctrine are an intent to divert the water to
a beneficial use,32 an actual diversion, and the application of the water for the
use intended.3 What exactly is considered to be an "economically beneficial
use" is difficult to determine, as it varies from state to state.34
27 See GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 24 (stating that riparianism presumes a surplus of
water).
28 See id. at 24-25.
29 Atlanta, for example, planned to siphon off 529 million gallons of water per day from
the "Hooch" by 2010, a 50% increase over 1990 levels. See River Rivalry, supra note 3, at
26. But see A. Dan Tarlock, Introduction to Symposium on Eastern Water Rights, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 535, 535-45 (1983) (asserting that riparianism still may be a workable
model for the future).
30 See GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 32.
' See id. at 33.
32 Traditionally, this meant domestic and economic uses, but has been extended to include
recreation, scenic beauty, and ecological concerns. See id. at 35-36.
3' See id. at 35; see also GETCHES, supra note 7, at 79.
Generally, states employ a hierarchy of uses. Domestic, agricultural (irrigation,
stockwatering) and industrial uses (power generation, mining, milling) are accorded top
preference, followed by fish, wildlife and recreation uses. See GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at
[Vol 21:697
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Even if an owner is granted the right to take water away from a
stream, the state still can apply restrictions on the types of usage. It is not
uncommon for western states to restrict transportation of water, return flow
rates, and the like, in the interest of protecting downstream water users.35
Moreover, state water administrations may require those seeking access to
water to purchase licenses or permits for use.36 In a manner of speaking,
then, western states actually attempt to put a price on water usage.37 By doing
so, those who use the water can develop cost estimates that reflect the actual
cost to society of doing business. In a law and economics sense, this is good
law, though it is not without flaws.
One of the backbones of the prior appropriation doctrine is the idea
that earlier appropriators have precedence over those who recently have
acquired water rights. 38 In short, prior appropriation doctrine is based on the
notion of "first in time, first in right. '39  Though the rights of prior
appropriators can be forfeited through abandonment or adverse possession,40
the system could favor older interests over the most efficient uses.4' The
system also provides the possibility for interested parties to purchase rights
from owners so that water resources can be traded like fuels and other natural
resources.42 Thus, water is allocated to the most economically beneficial use.
" See Somach, supra note 11, at 2 10-12.
'o See id.
7 Although this price is different from the usual prices that consumers pay to the water
company for water.
" See David Elliott Prange, Note, Regional Water Scarcity and the Galloway Proposal,
17 ENVTL. L. 81, 85 (1986) (calling this doctrine the "principal tenet of Western water law").
" The Supreme Court coined this phrase in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555
(1963).
40 See William R. Fischer & Ward H. Fischer, Appropriation Doctrine, in WATER
RIGHTS OF THE FIFTY STATES AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 23, 28.
4' This is true particularly in times of shortage. See Kathleen Marion Carr & James D.
Crammond, Introduction, in WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE xix, xx (Kathleen
M. Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995).
42 See id.
1997]
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This is what law and economics theorists intend when they assert that laws
should direct society to the most efficient use of its resources.
43
C. The New Eastern Philosophy: Hybrid Systems
Due to the failure of the riparian system to adequately deal with
increasing claims on decreasingly available stream flows, many eastern states
have moved towards hybrid systems.44 While recognizing the riparian rights
of prior landowners, these systems institute permit schemes for new drains
on watercourses.45 In addition, these hybrid systems focus less on priority of
rights than do western prior appropriation systems.46 Permits are granted and
administered by one central agency, with the exception of Florida, which
employs a regional system.47 The major drawback is that, though these
systems do provide for application fees for permits, most states do not have
a means to collect royalty payments for continued use. 48 However, hybrid
systems are a step in the right direction and are the trend in the East, rather
than an exception to the rule.49
41 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 22 (4th ed. 1992).
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
45 See GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 26.
4 See id.
7 See id.
48 See id. at 27.
41 See George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE FIFTY STATES
AND TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 6, 9 (citing the trend towards hybrid systems in the East);
MacDonald, supra note 16, at 22.
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III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
Law and economics theory, as applied in a non-anti-trust setting, is a
fairly recent development injurisprudence. 0 The general idea underlying law
and economics analysis is that "many of the doctrines and institutions of the
legal system are best understood and explained as efforts to promote the
efficient allocation of resources."'" The scope of law and economics theory
has both a normative and a positive aspect. Normative analysis consists of
looking at how policy decisions would lead to differing results in terms of
lost opportunity cost.52 Though the economist does not make value
judgments per se, the economist can look at how different solutions would
result in trade-offs between efficiency and other social values. The economist
also can look at past policies and determine their efficiency. 3
Positive economic analysis, on the other hand, looks at the present
situation and discusses how things became the way they are. 4 Together,
these normative and positive elements direct economic analysis to the most
efficient outcomes for society. Judge Posner refers to this as the efficiency
theory of common law.55 Though he believes that statutory or constitutional
laws tend to focus less on efficiency, Posner notes the possibility of efficient
allocation of resources by statutory means. 6 Interstate water compacts, for
example, create just such an efficient solution to resource problems.
o The "new law and economics," as it is called by Judge Richard Posner, grew out of the
articles of Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase in the early 1960s. See POSNER, supra note
43, at 16; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1
(1960); see also A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 98-105 (4th ed. 1932).
5' POSNER, supra note 43, at 22.




See id. (".Statutory or constitutional as distinct from common law fields are less likely
to promote efficiency, yet even they... are permeated by economic concerns and illuminated
by economic analysis.")
1997]
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It is now possible to take a positive law and economics analysis of
how different water rights regimes have developed in the various regions of
the U.S. The starting point for such an analysis is what is commonly referred
to as "the tragedy of the commons."57 This doctrine states that public goods
are likely to be utilized inefficiently by society." A fitting example is a lake
full of fish. Fishermen with no economic stake in the lake itself are unlikely
to care about maximizing long-term harvests. As a result, the fishermen are
likely to overfish the lake, squandering its value.
Consider, however, a fisherman who seeks to assert ownership over
the lake. Harold Demsetz proposed the theory that property rights will be
developed if they will add to economic efficiency.59 Demsetz applied this
theory to the development of property rights in French Canada as a result of
the fur trade.6" The right to property included the right to harvest the pelts of
animals on that land. 6 Demsetz also argued that property interests made it
prudent for landowners to protect their resources, both from other hunters and
from their own over-hunting.62
Returning to the lake example, an economically rational fisherman
decides that the best way to ensure a high income level is to gain control of
the lake. The fisherman buys the lake from the state and secures it from other
fishermen. Two things immediately result. First, overfishing is stopped
" See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968) (postulating
that the population dilemma does not have a technical solution, but requires a moral
solution).
See id. at 1244.
. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS
AND PROC. 348, 350 (1967) (Demsetz's thesis is that "property rights develop to internalize
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of
internalization").
60 See id. at 351-53. Demsetz relied on the studies of Eleanor Leacock and Frank Speck
as the basis for his analysis of the rise of property rights with regard to the fur trade. See
generally Eleanor Leacock, The Montagnais "Hunting Territory" and the Fur Trade, 57
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST Memoir No. 78 (1954); Frank G. Speck, The Basis of American
Indian Ownership of Land, 1915 OLD PENN WEEKLY REV. 490, 491-95 (1915).




because outsiders are excluded and the prudent fisherman seeks to maximize
long-term income by stock management. Second, the price of the fish taken
from the lake increases. At first, this would seem to be a negative externality
on society; however, that is not the case. The higher price now more fully
reflects the true cost to society of using fish from that lake. The price signals
the relative scarcity of the resource and its value to society. Without such
protection, the price may remain low, at least until the fish are depleted. At
that point, the price of fish caught (surely not of the quality previously sold)
will skyrocket, and ultimately no fish will remain for harvesting. Thus, in the
absence of property rights, the tragedy of the commons will have generated
a long-term, dead weight loss on society.
The prior appropriation doctrine of the Western United States is a fine
example of Demsetz's principle. The scarcity of water led those seeking
water rights to construct a regime to protect their interests.63 By doing so,
water-rights owners maximized their economic utility without fear of others
impinging on those rights.64 The system creates certainty, which, in turn,
fosters greater development. 5 On the other hand, riparianism arguably
illustrates a weak form of the tragedy of the commons. Though the
reasonable use doctrine66 does put some emphasis on economically efficient
uses, the uncertainty of rights under the riparian regime has led to over-
utilization of water resources by upstream users, often adversely affecting
more efficient downstream uses.67 It is precisely for this reason that the trend
away from riparianism is such a positive step towards a more beneficial
system for society on the whole.
Two models that deal with the question of what is, in fact, beneficial
to society are the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks ("K-H") models. Both the Pareto
model and the K-H model do much to explain why certain developments in
law lead to net gains for society. Each model, however, works from
63 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
" See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
,7 See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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somewhat different premises.68 The notion of Pareto superiority is simple;
an economic outcome is superior so long as at least one member of society
is positively affected, with no detrimental effects falling on any other member
of society.69 An example of such a policy would be a tax cut that encourages
better investment by individual members of society rather than the
government. With each member of society using the money to improve his
or her economic standing, the net gain to society would be greater than the
value of any loss of government services that may occur.
K-H superiority works somewhat differently. An outcome is K-H
superior if one party could compensate the other and still maintain a net
economic gain. In effect, one party buys off another and puts the resources
to better use. An example may be a cement factory buying out neighboring
residential developments because the value of goods created by the factory
is far greater than the aggregated value of the residential properties. 7 This
does not mean, necessarily, that the cement company may pay only the bare
minimum to get the other parties back to where they would have been had no
action taken place (though that it a possible outcome). Any "pay off' up to
the surplus value created by the more efficient use is K-H superior.
While all Pareto superior outcomes are K-H superior, the reverse is
not always the case. 72 Still, the benefit to society under a K-H superior
system can be excellent in the long run, as resources flow to more efficient
uses. The problem with K-H analysis is that it can fail to deal with intangible
68 In fact, the K-H Model is sometimes referred to as potential Pareto superiority. See
POSNER, supra note 43, at 14-15.
69 See id. at 13-14.
70 See id. Charles K. Rowley described K-H efficiency in terms of the ability of gainers
in policy changes to potentially overcompensate losers, without those losers being able to
potentially overcompensate the gainers. See Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and the
Economic Analysis of Law, in LAW AND EcONOMICS 123, 130-31 (Nicholas Mercuro ed.,
1989).
"' See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 219
(1970), and aff'd, 73 Misc. 2d 834 (1970).
72 See POSNER, supra note 43, at 13-14.
(Vol 21:697
SOUTHEASTERN WATER COMPACT
values." A home, for example, may have much more value to a family than
the price of the property. As a result, those who promote K-H solutions
constantly must be aware that other values may have to be weighed against
efficiency.
Additionally, law and economics theorists face the problem posed by
Scitovszky's paradox.74 Scitovszky recognized the economic benefits of K-H
models, but stated that they are inadequate to deal with original rights.75
Turning to the example of the lake, though the fisherman, once in control of
the lake, can enter into K-H transactions, how does one compensate another
if no tangible property right exists to begin with? Likewise, the absence of
tangible property rights in the context of watercourses poses a tremendous
hurdle. It is difficult to determine who exactly "owns" the entitlement to
water. The systems in place could not be scrapped easily without removing
hundreds of years of development based upon previously erected original
rights." In fact, there is now systemic inertia in place that makes a full-scale
revision of water rights difficult. This is one powerful reason why many
states moving away from riparian systems have grandfathered in previous
riparian rights.77 By working within these original rights, however, it is
possible to erect a system that enables water resources to flow to those who
will put the resources to the best possible use.
The Coase theorem78 serves as a powerful benchmark against which
to measure the efficiency of any water rights policy. The theorem itself is
part of a greater framework laid out by Ronald Coase in his article The
7 See id.
7 See Tibor Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REv. ECON.
STUD. 75, 77 (1941).
7 See id.
'" See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
17 Even prior appropriation states locked into interstate compacts have sought to protect
previously held rights. See, e.g., Colorado River Compact art. VIII, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-61-101 (West 1990).
71 See Coase, supra note 50, at 1.
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Problem of Social Cost.79 The article suggests a five "pillar" strategy for
tackling economic analysis in the legal context.
80
The first pillar is the Coase theorem itself, which states that in the
absence of transaction costs, parties will seek out the allocatively efficient
result." The second pillar suggests that harm is often joint; each party in a
dispute creates a negative externality upon the other.82 For example, a hotel
owner could decide to build a fourteen-story addition to a hotel which borders
a residential property. The addition will affect negatively the residential
owner by blocking out sunlight. On the other hand, a challenge to the hotel
owner's right to expand operations will limit the hotel's profitability.83
Whoever wins in a dispute like this inflicts a negative externality upon the
other. Furthermore, the level of harm created can be ascertained only after
the court has decided who owns the entitlement to the affected property.
84
The third pillar could be termed "Positive Coase." This pillar
reiterates the idea introduced by the second pillar-that an externality is
harmful only if an entitlement to the affected property is owned by the
aggrieved party. The third pillar points out that the best way that law
determines an externality is vis-.-vis property rights.86 Thus the fisherman,
introduced earlier, only can claim an injury to his fish if it is determined that
79 Id.
" The five pillars of Coase's theory can be distilled from the various subsections of his
article. See id.
8' See id. at 3-8.
82 See id. at 2.
See Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959). For other examples of joint harm see Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D.
852 (1879) (involving the alleged nuisance to practice of doctor caused by the use of two
mortars and pestles by a confectioner located next door); Travis v. Moore 377 So. 2d 609
(Miss. 1979) (efforts by residential property owners to enjoin a funeral parlor from locating
in the area); Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (dealing with claim of
owner of solar-heated home against proposed construction by neighbor that would have
interfered with access to the sun).
84 See Coase, supra note 50, at 19-28.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
86 See Coase, supra note 50, at 3-8.
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the fisherman has an entitlement to the lake. When examined from this
standpoint, an externality in the context of the tragedy of the commons is a
misnomer to some extent. Because no one specifically owns an entitlement
to public property, it is impossible to have an externality in the Coasian
sense. However, that does not suggest that public property is not owned by
society as a whole. In fact, that is the only way to look at externalities in the
public property sense. Everyone is affected by the externality, because
everyone has an entitlement.
Coase also recognized the importance of transaction costs in real
disputes. The fourth pillar suggests that transaction costs do matter in
determining an efficient solution.87 One of the most important costs facing
economic analysis is strategic in nature. Strategic costs take two major
forms: holdouts and free-riders.8 The concept of the holdout and the free-
rider are not altogether different; they are opposite sides of the same coin.
Holdouts invariably drive up transaction costs by refusing to negotiate until
a windfall can be achieved, whereas free-riders refuse to bear the costs of
positive externalities.8 9 In effect, a holdout is a free-rider on the coattails of
the transaction. The law must take into account these realities, because
elimination of the problem is improbable.
The final pillar posits that courts should try to achieve K-H superior
results.90 Because Pareto optimization is difficult to achieve, it is generally
infeasible for the courts to apply the Pareto model. However, once a court
has determined who owns an entitlement, it is much easier for a court to
analyze the situation and determine the proper outcome.9'
87 See id. at 15-18 (major costs include communication and monitoring expenses, once a
solution has been determined).
SB See id.
g See id.
o See id. at 27-28. Though not mentioning K-H efficiency, Coase does state that "[w]hat
has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which
would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm." Id.
9" For example, a court could determine the nature of the rights protected and whether
compensation should be awarded.
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The major problem behind a law and economics approach is that in
some cases economics cannot answer the question of how a resource will be
distributed. There are always cases where no amount of efficiency analysis
can generate an outcome favorable to the parties, particularly if society sees
other concerns as superior to economic efficiency.92 One additional problem
involves information. To achieve a truly rational economic decision, a party
must have access to all available information. A judge or administrative body
must be knowledgeable about the issues and values related to entitlements.
Making sure that this information is available should be the paramount
concern in any attempt to institute a system following law and economics
principles.
IV. THE SOUTHEASTERN WATER PACT
One of the major problems facing the states involved in the dispute
over the Chattahoochee River is that the states employ two different regimes.
Florida utilizes a system governed by statute,93 while both Georgia and
Alabama are governed by a riparian regime.94
The Chattahoochee, as mentioned earlier, is the major source of
drinking water for the metro-Atlanta area.95 The United States Army Corps
of Engineers was directed to create Lake Sidney Lanier for precisely that
9 An example may be found in the rise of the "Public Trust Doctrine" growing out of
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (The Mono Lake
Case). The Public Trust Doctrine is based on the notion that "environmental demands now
could be made on existing uses of water rights, and that those uses might have to be adjusted
in order to maintain or restore natural ecosystem values." Joseph L. Sax, Bringing an
Ecological Perspective to Natural Resources Law: Fulfilling the Promise of the Public Trust,
in NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY AND LAW: TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 148, 149 (Lawrence
J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 1993). As Sax explains, Public Trust Doctrine has as
its underlying precept "public entitlement to the benefit of natural systems." Id. at 150.
Economically, this may not be the best use for land, yet society has deemed aesthetic,
spiritual, and environmental concerns paramount.
" See Flood, supra note 8, at 43.
14 See id. at 37, 43.
" See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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purpose." A 1990 plan for Atlanta's growth included provisions to create
reservoirs that would have held back an additional 529 million gallons of
water a day from the river.9 7 The reason for such a large increase in the
amount retained in Lake Lanier was Atlanta's robust growth projections for
upcoming years. 98
The reaction from Alabama was fairly swift. In 1991 Alabama,
seeking to enjoin the Army Corps of Engineers from enacting the plan, filed
suit in Federal Court.99 This suit was later joined by Florida in an effort to
secure water flows in the Apalachiola River.' The parties set aside the suit
while the Army Corps of Engineers conducted a comprehensive study of
water usage in the river basin.'' Uncertainty over the study results, coupled
with Georgia's desire for an expedited resolution to the controversy, led the
states and the Corps of Engineers to form a compromise agreement in
1992.102 Alabama was especially eager to enter into such an agreement
because its claim to the Chattahoochee River is questionable.'0 3
The agreement stipulates that each state support a three million dollar
study of water resources in the Chattahoochee River Basin.0 4 Second,
Q See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7 See River Rivalry, supra note 3, at 26.
98 Georgia planned to increase withdrawals from the Chattahoochee by 50% by the year
2010. This would be done to keep pace with a projected 800,000 person increase in
Atlanta's population over the next two decades. See Greg Jaffe, Water Deal May Settle Old
Dispute WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1996, at F1, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 11797854.
" See Brief for Plaintiff, Alabama v. United States (N.D. Ala. 1990) (No. CV-90-H-
01331-E).
'o See Jaffe, supra note 98, at Fl.
'o' See id.
102 See id. (Georgia's eagerness for an agreement is based on projections of a population
boom in the Atlanta area).
Io. See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 207-11 (examining Alabama's tenuous claim to the Chatt-
ahoochee River); see also Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505 (1859) (holding that
the west bank of the Chattahoochee River constituted Alabama's eastern border).
"o See Memorandum of Agreement by, between, and among the State of Alabama, the
State of Florida, the State of Georgia, and the United States Department of the Army, Jan.
3, 1992, at 1, 5. The cost of the study has since grown to $15 million.
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Alabama agreed to halt its legal action, and in return, water use levels were
frozen temporarily, with increases only taking place after notification to all
parties.0 5 Finally, the states agreed to negotiate and share information with
each other.0 6 This agreement has been renewed twice since its enactment, 
07
with the ultimate goal of establishing a regional solution to the conflict over
the "Hooch."' '
There are three typical solutions for water rights disputes such as the
one now existing in the Southeast: congressional apportionment, judicial
apportionment, and interstate compacts. While water rights occasionally are
apportioned by Congress or the Supreme Court, the use of interstate compacts
is, undoubtedly, the most common and desirable method. The reason for this
conclusion is that congressional and judicial apportionment schemes often are
based on incomplete information, and, in the case of legislative
apportionment, often reflect non-economic concerns that dictate decisions.
A. Congressional Apportionment
The Supreme Court originally held in Kansas v. Colorado'0 9 that
congressional apportionment of water rights was not valid under the
Constitution. 0 This ruling was overturned a half century later, when the
Court held in Arizona v. California.' that Congress's implied powers,
especially under the Commerce Clause, allowed for legislative apportionment
of water rights in the Colorado River." 2 However, Congress has seemed
reluctant to apply this power to all water rights disputes. In fact, the only
'05 See id. at 2-3, 6.
lob See id. at 2.
07 See Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement, Jan. 18, 1994; Supplemental Memo-
randum of Agreement, Sept. 30, 1996.
08 See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 104, at 1.
109 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
"0 See id. at 97.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
1,2 See id. at 564-67.
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instance since Arizona v. California in which Congress has decided to
apportion water rights was the conflict over the Truckee and Carson Rivers
and Lake Tahoe.' 3
The success of the apportionment scheme in the "Truckee Dispute,"
at least in the short run, has prompted some commentators to promote more
pervasive use of congressional apportionment of water rights. "4 Though it
is attractive to have Congress usurp control of all water disputes, this
approach has two important flaws that make congressional apportionment,
from a law and economics perspective, an inefficient choice. The first major
shortcoming is that Congress is often not very well informed about the
problems facing a particular region, and even if that information is available,
a question of genuine interest also is raised." 5 Congress, through the use of
hearings and other investigative mechanisms, can inform itself to a certain
point regarding a particular water dispute.'" On the other hand, it is highly
unlikely that a typical member of Congress has the type of specialized
knowledge necessary to deal with certain aspects of water disputes." 7
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a senator from Maryland will be particularly
interested in a dispute over the Canada River. What is likely to result in such
a setting is a solution that is made with inadequate information-a clear
violation of the five pillars of Coase. 1"8 Thus, the allocation mechanism that
Congress would enact is likely to be based on water values that do not have
a strong basis in reality.
A second, and more cynical reason for opposing congressional
apportionment is based on political reality. Congress is not an economic
body, but is influenced by powerful interests." 9 Thus, any decision made by
" See Jerome C. Muys, Approaches and Considerations for Allocation of Interstate
Waters, in WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 311, 312.
" See E. Leif Reid, Note, Ripples from the Truckee: The Casefor Congressional Ap-
portionment of Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 147-48 (1995).
' See Muys, supra note 113, at 311-12.
116 See id.
"' See id.
I See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
"'9 Muys, supra note 113, at 312.
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Congress is not necessarily based on notions of efficiency. Instead,
individual members of Congress could give in to "special interests" and
therefore vote against economically advantageous decisions. 2 ' For example,
if a Southern Cotton Growers lobby could exert enough influence on
members of Congress from the southeast region, Georgia could wind up with
windfalls, while Alabama and Florida would be forced to deal with fewer
water resources. It is because of special interest influence, more than the
informational restraints, that congressional apportionment should be avoided
at all costs.
B. Judicial Apportionment
A second means to allot water rights between states is the doctrine of
judicial apportionment. The Supreme Court has constitutional authority over
"[c]ontroversies between two or more States,"'' and additional legislative
authority from Congress provides that the Court "shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies between two or more States." 122
Using this authority, the Court developed its own system of allocation
of water rights in disputes between states.22 The doctrine of "Equitable
Apportionment" was first introduced in Kansas v. Colorado.24 The term
states exactly the goal of the Court in applying the standard--equitably
dividing the pie for all parties. To do so, the Court laid out a number of
factors to consider, including: priority of appropriation, physical and
I See id.
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 1997). In its original jurisdiction, the court
effectively serves as a trial court. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 657
(1838).
123 The Court's original jurisdiction "has been invoked in disputes on the Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Laramie, Mississippi, North Platte, Rio Grande, Verneo,
and Walla Walla Rivers." CHARLES J. MEYERS ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
950 (3d ed. 1988).
124 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907); see also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (ap-
plying the equitable apportionment principle).
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climactic conditions, consumptive uses of water in the different sections of
the river, character and rate of return flows to the river, the extent of
established uses, availability of storage water, practical effect of wasteful uses
on downstream users, and damages to upstream users as compared to benefits
downstream.'25 The Court asserted that this list was not exhaustive, thereby
laying the groundwork for a nearly infinite number of considerations.'26
Although the Court in Nebraska v. Wyoming'27 asked the right
questions, it freely admitted that it was not the best venue in which to decide
the issue. 28 The Court restated this idea in Texas v. New Mexico. 129 The
central criticism ofjudicial allocation of water resources under the Equitable
Apportionment doctrine is that the court lacks the expertise that is necessary
to make allocation decisions of such monumental importance."' In fact,
unless the Justices of the Supreme Court were educated fully as to the issues
involved in water apportionment decisions, it would be impossible for them
to establish an economically optimal decision. To educate the Court to a
point where it could make a somewhat informed decision requires far too
many resources to be truly efficient. For example, Arizona v. California3'
cost several million dollars to litigate, with thousands of pages of data, most
125 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618.
126 See id.
127 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
'2 See id. at 616. In fact, the court, in cases of water rights disputes, employs a Special
Master to hear the evidence, decide on motions, determine legal questions, and recommend
the solution. Though the Court has the final decision, it pays greater deference to the Special
Master's determination. See William D. Olcott, Comment, Equitable Apportionment: A
Judicial Bridge Over Troubled Waters, 66 NEB. L. REV. 734, 736 (1987).
29 462 U.S. 554, 575-76 (1983).
3' See Erha rdt, supra note 1, at 213-14; see also GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 53 (claim-
ing the court lacks the technical resources to handle complicated questions involved in
apportioning water rights).
' ' 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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of which would appear to be nothing more than scientific nonsense to one
without a technical background.' 32
Second, even if the Supreme Court could develop a solution for a
particular water rights dispute, the system created would amount to nothing
more than a series of quick fixes.'33 This is true because the only mechanism
available to states with a grievance under an equitable apportionment system
is more litigation. The Court does not have the resources to monitor
constantly the parties to a dispute, creating an incentive for states to "cheat"
because further litigation is ungainly and incremental increases in
consumption by upstream users may go unnoticed. Even if noticed, the
chance that another state would mount a full-scale judicial attack on that
action is slim. After all, it took a fairly drastic plan by Georgia and the Army
Corps of Engineers to push Alabama to action in 1992.31
Together, the lack of Court expertise, high cost of litigation,
adjudicatory elements, and incentives to cheat, all create a system fraught
with extremely high transaction costs that will, even in the short run, amount
to inefficient allocation of water rights. It is precisely for this reason that the
Court is so reluctant to play the role of referee in a water rights dispute., 35 It
is also for this reason that the Court openly favors the use of interstate
compacts. 136
312 See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 214 n.74 ("In addition, judicial apportionment is expens-
ive ... the Special Master in Arizona v. California received, as compensation (not including
expenses), $185,000. Prof. Corker, who represented California in the litigation, estimates
total costs at $50 million.") (quoting CHARLES MEYERS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 402 (2d ed. 1980)); see also GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 53
(discussing the high cost of litigation).
' See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 214 n.75 (discussing the lack of finality inherent with
equitable apportionment).
'4 See supra text accompanying notes 99-108
'3 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
36 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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C. Interstate Water Compacts
The final means to divide water rights between states is the use of an
interstate compact. 37 The key issue underlying these compacts is prior
appropriation for future use. While negotiating compacts, states attempt to
anticipate future uses of water and apportion rights accordingly.1 3' Therefore,
the most important aspect of any compact is the enforcement mechanism,
which could take one of two forms. The first model is a prescriptive
mechanism that provides guidelines for state agencies to implement. 39 The
purpose of such a scheme is "to delimit the scope of the arrangements, to
control the use of the resource, to control the activities of the management
agencies themselves, and to protect the arrangement."' 40  In effect, the
agreement becomes the enforcement mechanism for apportioning water rights
between the states.
A second approach is the use of an interstate commission or agency. ' 41
Such commissions consist of representatives of each state involved and
'3' Buck, Gleason, and Jofuku divide interstate compacts into three groups: binding with-
out congressional consent, binding with congressional consent ,and non-binding. The authors
point out that though the non-binding compacts would appear unlikely to work well, they are
in fact effective. See Susan J. Buck et al., "The Institutional Imperative: Resolving
Transboundary Water Conflict in Arid Agricultural Regions of the Unites States and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 595, 619 (1993).
' See Muys, supra note 113, at 314 n. 17 (citing the Colorado River Compact); see also
Saunders, Reflections of Sixty Years of Water Law Practice, 1 COLO. L. REV., Resource Law
Notes 7, 9-10 (1989); Richard A. Sims et al., Interstate Compacts and Equitable
Apportionment, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 23.01, § 23.03 (1988).
' See, e.g., Colorado River Compact art. III, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West
1990).
"4 Buck et al., supra note 137, at 619 (quoting V. Tinsely & L. Nielsen, Interstate Fisher-
ies Arrangements: Application of a Pragmatic Classification Scheme for Interstate
Arrangements, 6 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 265, 272 (1987)).
141 See id. (the Upper Colorado River Compact, Rio Grande Compact and Delaware River
Basin Compact are examples of this form of administration).
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usually includes the federal government. 4 2 It is within these commissions
that the true worth of a water compact is revealed. Commissions, as
permanently standing bodies, can accumulate information and can remain
constantly in negotiation, thus adapting to changing circumstances.
Additionally, the commission system lowers transaction costs, because all
information collection and negotiation is centralized. For these reasons, the
use of interstate water compacts results in both short-term and long-term
efficiency.
One constraint on these negotiated solutions is that the compacts often
are subject to congressional approval 4 3 under Article I of the Constitution.'
There is some dispute over how the Compact Clause applies in practice. In
particular, the issue is whether the nature of the compact dictates whether it
must be approved by Congress or not.'45 One view, building upon the
language of Virginia v. Tennessee,146 asserts that a compact only needs to be
approved when it threatens the political balance of power. 4 ' The general
consensus, however, which finds support in Dyer v. Sims, 4 ' is that all
compacts require congressional consent. In fact, in the water rights context
this seems particularly true. Because nearly every river is to some degree tied
to interstate trade, Congress's power under the Commerce Clause allows the
national legislature to have a say in any state action that affects a
142 See, e.g., Upper Colorado River Compact art. VIII, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-62-
101 (West 1990); Rio Grande Compact art. XII, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-66-101 (West
1990); Delaware River Basin Compact § 2.2, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1974).
' This is true notwithstanding the classification made by authors Buck et al. See supra
note 137.
'4" See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . .
141 See Muys, supra note 113, at 314, 318 n.16.
148 U.S. 503 (1893) (boundary dispute case between Virginia and Tennessee).
47 See 148 U.S. at 518-19.
'48 341 U.S. 22 (195 1) (holding compact to control water pollution is not invalid because
it delegates police power to the federal government).
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watercourse.'49  In the dispute over the Chattahoochee, congressional
involvement is especially important, due to the strong presence of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.5 0 Thus, any final action regarding the "Hooch"
certainly requires Congressional approval. The need for such approval is not
a particularly large hurdle to clear for states wishing to utilize water
compacts. Since Congress first approved a water compact dealing with the
Colorado River in 1922, it has approved at least thirty other compacts dealing
with various interstate water rights issues. 5 Furthermore, Congress rarely
refuses to ratify a compact, once negotiated."'
As mentioned before, one of the principal advantages of water
compacts over other methods of apportionment is that water compacts
centralize information and thus lower transaction costs.1 3  Tied to this
advantage is the idea of certainty. Because compacts create a baseline for
apportionment of rights in the long run, as well as establishing an authorized
body to deal with, compacts generate a level of certainty for those utilizing
water resources. Certainty, the basis of contract theory, assists in planning
for all economic actors, be they public or private." The contract analogy
goes further than that recognized by the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Mexico.'55 The Court pointed out that because compacts had such a
'4 See Muys, supra note 113, at 311; see also Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546, 597-98
(1963).
15o See supra text accompanying notes 95-108.
'5 See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 216 n.86 (citing JEROME C. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER
COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT 5 (National
Water Commission 1971); GOLDFARB, supra note 26, at 54.
15, However, Congress did not approve the 1970 Compact between California and Nevada
to solve the Tahoe Truckee dispute. See Reid, supra note 114, at 160 n. 95.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
" See Charles Seabrook, State Releases Details of Plans on Waterways Formulas to be
Worked out with Fla., Ala., ATL. J. & CONST., Dec. 12, 1996, at A21, available in 1996 WL
8245987 ("Under the compacts, Georgia will 'give up some sovereignty' over the rivers that
originate within its boundaries, but it 'would gain certainty' in how much water it can depend
on for growth.....").
"' 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (("[A] Compact is, after all, a contract.") (quoting Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
contractual similarity, contract remedies such as rescission or reformation
were possible. 5 6 Thus, compacts have a judicial safety valve built into them
should the commission system fail to adequately deal with unforeseen
circumstances. On the whole, the commission system allows for equitable
and efficient allocation of resources, without many of the efficiency concerns
haunting the judicial and congressional apportionment schemes.
This is not to say, however, that compacts are flawless. One of the
biggest problems facing states using such compacts is that water supply
estimates often are inaccurate. 157 This is troublesome because these estimates
form the basis for long-term "fine-tuning" of allocations. If estimates are
sufficiently inaccurate, the basis for the system is undermined. Consequently,
commissions must be especially careful to keep such problems in mind when
dealing with any estimates.
A second flaw in the system is the specter of federal interference with
the compact mechanism.'58 One aspect of this problem is the need for
congressional approval of water compacts.'59 By requiring such approval, the
system limits the contractual rights of the states, and thus the Supreme
Court's contract analogy falls short. Also, state water compacts, in several
cases, do not adequately deal with federal water uses. A compact that does
not account for federal drains on water resources is doomed to fail. All users
must be accounted for and dealt with for a compact to be successful. An
omission of the federal government's interests in water rights means that any
decisions made will fail under Coase's five pillars. 6 0
58 See id. (noting the ability of the Court to fashion remedies for failure to perform, along
with mandating future performance).
"' See Muys, supra note 113, at 314 n.17 (suggesting that 13.5 million acre-feet per
annum is the actual use of the upper basin, instead of the 17.5 million allocated by the
compact).
8 In the case of the "Hooch," the federal government is represented by the large presence
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and its role in development of the Chattahoochee Lake
Lanier. See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 217-24.
151 See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 78-9 1.
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Another problem with the compact paradigm is that commissions are
not given free rein over water policy. The representatives on commissions
still must answer to their state legislatures. 6' Furthermore, if the federal
government is not a signatory to the compact, there is always the possibility
of bullying by the federal government. Additionally, compacts can create an
incentive for parties to break the agreement. The situation in a water compact
is somewhat analogous to that of the famous "prisoner's dilemma."'' 12 Even
after an effective mechanism is in place, each state has much to gain by
ignoring the agreement.63
One final problem, on the public side of the equation, is the role of special
interests within each state. The fact that rights are apportioned to each state
does not necessarily mean that water will, by definition, flow to the most
efficient users within each states. Instead, those who have the greatest
political power can exact privileges within the state that may put resources
to inefficient uses.164
On a private level, water compacts can create short-term uncertainty
for users. Though compacts are forward looking, there may be sacrifices in
short- and long-term consumption that must be made. These sacrifices will,
to some measure, fall on large private users to the point that such compact-
induced scaling back could rise to the level of a constitutional "taking.' ' 65 A
compact, to truly reflect economic reality, must have some means by which
6 See, e.g., Colorado River Compact art. VI, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West
1990); Upper Colorado River Compact art. VIII, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-62-101 (West
1990); Rio Grande Compact art. XII, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-66-101 (West 1990).
162 See KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT VOL. 1: PLAYING FAIR
102-04 (1994) (describing the "dilemma" when two distinct parties must make a rational
choice without the benefit of consultation).
163 This is true because the generally accepted solution to the "prisoner's dilemma" is for
each party to act selfishly. See id.
' See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
65 See Delaware River Basin Compact § 14.14, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1974)
(outlining condemnation procedures).
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to compensate the losers. This is the requirement of K-H efficiency,1 66 and
one of Coase's pillars. 1
67
V. THE REGIONAL APPROACH To WATER RIGHTS
The water supply situation in the Southwestern United States is
similar to the dilemma facing Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.168 Like the
Chattahoochee River, the combination of the Colorado and Rio Grande
Rivers account for a huge portion of the Southwest's irrigation. 69 Also like
the Chattahoochee/Apalachiola River Basin, the Colorado and Rio Grande
pass through several states, each with conflicting claims to the waters. 170
These conflicting claims have led to the development of three main region-
based regimes to deal with water apportionment. 7' These regimes are based
on the Colorado River Compact,172 Upper Colorado River Compact,7 7 and
Delaware River Basin Compact. 74  Additionally, the conflict over the
Delaware River Basin has led to a substantially more advanced system of
interstate water rights: the federal-interstate compact. 17
66 See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
.6 Combined, the rivers constitute 90% of the irrigation resources for the region. See
Buck et al., supra note 137, at 610.
70 The Colorado passes through Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming. The Rio Grande passes through Colorado and New Mexico, and then forms the
Texas-Mexico border. See id.
' See id. at 619.
17: Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West 1990).
Upper Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-62-101 (West 1990).
Delaware River Basin Compact, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1974).
"7 See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 224-27.
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A. The Colorado River Basin Regimes
1. The Colorado River Compact
The Colorado River Compact of 1922176 ("CRC") is based on the
notion of "equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of
the Colorado River system" 1 77 and beneficial consumptive use.1 78 It provides
7,500,000 acre feet of water per year for economically beneficial use'79 to the
states of both the upper 8' and lower basin. 8' The CRC also preserves
.,present perfected rights" in the beneficial use of the Colorado River,8 2 thus
building certainty for past users. The establishment of predictability for
original uses is essential because only the certainty of basic entitlements
allows the law to distribute those rights peripherally under a K-H setting.' 3
What the CRC lacks, however, is a mechanism for an interstate
committee. Instead, any disputes are handled on an ad hoc basis.' 84 Herein
lies one of the more troubling aspects of this type of regime. The benefits of
having set water allocations are disrupted by the fact that there is limited
flexibility inherent in the system.'85 The lack of a standing commission
176 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West 1990).
,77 id. art. I.
178 See id.
'v" See id. art. 111(a).
180 The compact defines the "Upper Basin" as "those parts of the States of Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming within and from which waters naturally drain
into the Colorado River System above Lee Ferry." Id. art. lI(f).
.8. The "Lower Basin" is defined as "those parts of the States of Arizona, California,
Nevada, New Mexico and Utah within and from which waters naturally drain into the
Colorado River System below Lee Ferry." Id. art. 11(g).
8 See id. art. VIII.
183 See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
184 In the event of a dispute, the governors of the states in dispute are to name commiss-
ioners to negotiate an adjustment, ultimately subject to congressional approval. See Colorado
River Compact art. VI.
'" See id. art. III.
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greatly increases transaction costs whenever a dispute arises. There are costs
in naming commissioners, setting up negotiations, gathering information, and
ultimately negotiating a new deal. All of these costs could be reduced
dramatically by the institution of a permanent body to administer the river.
The CRC also suffers from the exclusion of the United States as a
signatory. The Directors of the United States Reclamation Service and the
United States Geological Survey are bound to cooperate, ex officio, but there
is nothing else within the terms of the agreement that places any burden on
the federal government to limit its potential uses.'86 It is very difficult to
effectively allocate resources with one major user left out of the equation.
Hence, the Colorado River Compact falls short of the economic ideal.
2. Upper Colorado River Compact
The Upper Colorado River Compact' ("UCRC") is a step in the right
direction. Its purpose is to specifically allocate the 7,500,000 acre feet of
water provided to the upper river basin in the CRC. '88 Rather than set exact
numbers, 8' the states are granted percentages of the water flow' in order to
follow the concepts of equitable apportionment and beneficial use. This
apportionment works in conjunction Article III of the CRC to maintain exact
proportions, depending on water supplies in the Colorado, during times of
surplus and shortfall.' 9 '
The UCRC represents a significant step beyond the CRC by
including, within its provisions, the formation of the "Upper Colorado river
commission."' 92  The Commission has the power to adopt rules and
'86 See id. art. V.
117 Upper Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-62-101 (West 1990).
88 See id. art l(a).
s Arizona is limited to 50,000 acre-feet per year. See id. art. III(a)(l).
' Under the Agreement, Colorado is entitled to 51.75%, New Mexico receives 11.25%,
Utah receives 23%, and Wyoming has claim to 14% of the 7,500,000 minus Arizona's
50,000 acre-feet. See id. art. III(a)(2).
o' See id. art. IV.
'92 Id. art. VIII.
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regulations, engage in studies of the river and its tributaries, study stream
flows and uses, and, most importantly, "determine the quantity of the
consumptive use of water, which use is apportioned by article III hereof"' 93
Thus, the UCRC erects a mechanism for flexible application of the compact.
The advantages of such a system are significant. With long-standing
commissioners working together and information equally available to all
parties, any negotiations regarding future use require lower transaction costs.
The federal specter remains, however. Like the CRC, the United
States is not a signatory. Nevertheless, the UCRC does request the President
to appoint a commissioner.'94 This measure is a good step, but ultimately, it
falls short. Mere congressional approval of the UCRC and the appointment
of a commissioner does not bind the federal government to any set level of
usage. In fact, the UCRC provides that nothing within the statute can affect
any "rights or powers of the United States of America, its agencies or
instrumentalities, in or to the waters of the upper Colorado river system, or
its capacity to acquire rights in and to the use of said water."' 95 Thus, the
very purpose of such an agreement, the efficient allocation of water rights, is
defeated because one of the major users of water is left out of the equation.
One must look elsewhere for the economically optimal solution.
B. The Rio Grande Compact
The Rio Grande Compact 96 ("RGC") is slightly more troublesome to
decipher. Based on the notion of equitable apportionment,197 the compact
forces Colorado and New Mexico to allow certain levels of water to reach
downstream users.' 98 The RGC painstakingly lays out requirements for the
I ld. art. VI.
194 See id. art. VIII(a).
'9' Id. art. XIX.
'9' Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-66-101 (West 1990).
'9' See Buck et al., supra note 137, at 622.
"'s See id.
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parties, but allows for a certain level of flexibility within parameters set out
in the document.' 99
Like both of the Colorado River regimes, the RGC does not include
the federal government as a signatory. Further, any representative sent by the
United States government only would serve as a non-voting chair of the
commission created by the Compact."° For the reasons discussed above,"0 '
this may not be an optimal solution.
C. The Delaware River Basin Compact
The Delaware River Basin Compact" 2 ("DRBC") represents a
significant step towards efficiency in the use of water compacts. The DRBC
arose out of the realization that potentially 40,000,000 people will live within
the basin by the year 2010.203 Though water resources are plentiful, the
204resource must be managed properly for any potential population increase.
The DRBC represents one of the first attempts to create a truly integrated
water allocation mechanism.0 The DRBC accomplishes this by including
the federal government as a signatory to the pact, thus replacing the
overlapping authority of forty-three state agencies, fourteen interstate
9 See Rio Grande Compact arts. I, IV-VIII.
200 See id. art. XII.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 186, 195.
202 Delaware River Basin Compact, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (1974).
20" See id. § 1.
204 See id. § 1.3(d).
2o The text of the Compact points out that:
WHEREAS decisions of the United States Supreme Court relating to the
waters of the basin have confirmed the interstate regional character of the
water resources of the Delaware River Basin, and the United States Corps
of Engineers has in a prior report on the Delaware River Basin (House
Document 179, 73d Cong. 2nd Sess.) officially recognized the need for an
interstate agency and the economies that can result from unified




agencies, and nineteen federal agencies with one commission given broad
powers for administration of the river basin.2 6
The ramifications of this choice of administration are significant.
Under the DRBC, the federal government is no longer free to do as it wishes
on the Delaware River.20 7 Instead, the federal government must comply with
the water levels allocated to it by the compact, via the enforcing
commission.0 8 The pact tracks the doctrine of equitable apportionment, most
likely as an effort to avoid the rigidity of traditional compacts and to avoid
interference from the Supreme Court.
The DRBC meets several of the criteria of Coasian analysis.
Transaction costs are lowered because state and federal interests are weighed
concurrently and because the information acquired from federal sources adds
to the overall picture of water usage in a particular river basin. This type of
complete information is essential for parties to determine the allocatively
efficient level of water usage by each user of the watercourse.2 09 The ability
of the states to operate with the federal government on an equal basis within
the committee mechanism, centralizes negotiations further lowering costs.
Additional efficiency measures in the compact include the ability of
the commission to condemn property, including riparian rights, for use in
projects sponsored by the commission.1 ° Condemnation proceedings set up
a typical K-H system by which those who lose their entitlements are
compensated for the loss, allowing the entitlement to be used for more
efficient purposes. Also, the DRBC includes a section providing for penal
sanctions in the event "[a]ny person, association or corporation ' 21 violates
206 See id.
207 Section 1 of the Delaware River Basin Compact states that the Interstate River
Commission on the Delaware River Basin "concluded that regional development of the
Delaware River Basin is feasible, advisable and urgently needed; and has recommended that
an interstate compact with federal participation be consummated to this end." Id.
208 See id. arts. II, III.
209 See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
2"0 Delaware River Basin Compact § 14.14.
21l Id. § 14.17.
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the terms of the compact or the rules of the commission."' These efficiency
measures are a tremendous leap beyond the Colorado and Rio Grande
Compacts. Furthermore, the inclusion of the federal government as an active
participant in all decisions means that any determinations reached by the
commission have the air of greater authority. The imprimatur of authority,
in turn, may have the effect of limiting, at least to some extent, the incentive
for parties to engage in opportunistic activity.2"3
It is on this point, however, that an important shortcoming of the
DRBC reveals itself. Congress insisted on a "safety valve" clause within the
compact, which allows the federal government to effectively "seize" the
resources of the river in times of need. 2 4  This provision creates the
possibility, albeit a remote one, that the federal government could circumvent
completely the other terms of the compact. If such a use were so important
to the nation, it is likely the committee and the respective states would agree
to shift water usage accordingly. This would protect the integrity of the
compact at a fairly low cost in terms of negotiation and collection of
information. Yet, this important shortcoming is far outweighed by the large
gains in efficiency that are produced by the DRBC. Because of the
tremendous efficiency advantages, a federal-interstate compact represents the
most economically intelligent idea for Alabama, Florida, and Georgia to
pursue. The following section will look more closely to the efficiency
concerns addressed and raised by such a compact.
212 See id.
213 "[F]ederal codification 'limits the ability of a compacting state to withdraw from the
compact on any terms other than those set forth in the compact itself."' Reid, supra note 114,
at 161 (quoting JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 736 (2d ed.
1991)).
214 See Delaware River Basin Compact § 1.4.
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VI. LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL-INTERSTATE WATER
COMPACTS
The use of an federal-interstate water compact is not a painless
undertaking by any means. There are a number of problems that must be
considered before attempting to implement such a system. Foremost is the
problem of negotiating such a compact." 5 As the drawn out negotiations
over the "Hooch" show, even the most urgently needed compact can take
years to negotiate."' Upstream users are often in a very strong position in
such negotiations, as they are the first in time and right. Under a riparian
regime, such leverage is not particularly important due to the system's
protection of downstream users. However, state regimes are just that-
applicable to a particular state. As has been the case in the battle over the
"Hooch," only the fear that the Supreme Court would create a wholly
unacceptable solution brought the parties to the bargaining table.2"7
The bargaining process also is ripe for the possibility of "free- riders"
by allowing certain threatened states to do less of the work while enjoying all
of the benefits. In the case of the Chattahoochee, the low number of states
involved makes it easy to see if any one party attempts to free-ride in the
negotiating process. However, if such negotiations took place between the
signatories to the Colorado River Compact, for example, the opportunity for
free-riding is always present. An analogous problem arises after the compact
has been approved. Returning to the "prisoner's dilemma" problem, it is
always profitable, in the short-term, for one party to a compact to break ranks
and opportunistically "take from the cookie jar." Some authors note, on the
other hand, that compacts actually eliminate the incentive to "shirk" or "free-
ride," and that "[r]emoving discussion from the local level.., moderated the
interests of the states as separate parties in collective action deliberations."2"8
215 See Reid, supra note 114, at 175.
216 The Southeastern Water Pact has been negotiated over constantly since 1992.
217 See Charles Seabrook, '97 Georgia Legislature Murphy Panel Support Tri-State
Water Agreement, ATL. J. & CONST., Jan. 24, 1997, at B3, available in 1997 WL 3951219
(citing state House Speaker Tom Murphy's fear of U.S. Supreme Court intervention).
218 Buck et al., supra note 137, at 626.
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What is important to note is that incentives for opportunism continue to exist
even with the institution of a compact system, and that additional steps may
be required to prevent such activities. The Delaware River Basin Compact
represents a significant step in the right direction because of its inclusion of
penal sanctions for those who violate the compact.
A second major problem with the concept of a federal-interstate
compact is the ever-present specter of federal meddling.219 In the case of the
Southeastern Water Compact, the role of the Army Corps of Engineers makes
the federal government an especially important player. As discussed earlier,
the Corps has had a strong presence in the basin since the middle of the
century by virtue of several congressional acts. 220 In addition, a federal-
interstate compact would raise Commerce Clause problems. 2 Congress
always will hold a Commerce Clause trump card over any action by the
commission, though making the Untied States a party to the compact limits
that power considerably.
The DRBC solution, despite these shortfalls, serves as the most
appropriate means to allocate water rights between states. The reason is that
even with limited participation by the federal government, the commission
still can create a more vivid picture of the uses of water within the region and
prompt the parties to adjust accordingly. Further, a commission, with all
parties accounted for, remains a very flexible mechanism for apportioning
rights. A great deal of the formality of negotiating can be eliminated by using
such a compact because the parties are authorized to negotiate only subject
to certain restrictions. Any major change would require formal approval by
the states and the federal government, but minor changes can be implemented
and then "rubber stamped" by the respective governments with little fear that
interests are being sacrificed.
Again, the five pillars of Coase are useful to analyze the economic
efficiency of a compact, in particular, the DRBC model. The basic theorem
219 See supra note 158-60 and accompanying text. This could take the form of "bullying"
during the negotiation process for favorable terms (as could be the case with the escape valve
clause in the DRBC).
221 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
221 See U.S. CONsT. art 1, § 8, cl. 3.
[Vol 21:697
SOUTHEASTERN WATER COMPACT
states that in a world absent transaction costs, parties will negotiate the most
economically efficient outcome.22 2 Thus the question is raised-would an
interstate water compact, modeled after the DRBC, create the most efficient
solution for Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the United States government?
The fact that transaction costs would be reduced greatly by such an
arrangement already has been discussed. 23 The DRBC model also
recognizes the importance of property rights within the scheme . 2 4 The ideal
compact serves as the ingredients of a pie which can later be fixed in final
form and equitably divided by the commission. The DRBC is set up in just
such a way. In fact, such a system goes beyond K-H optimization, almost
achieving Pareto superior allocations which increase the size of the pie for
all. The DRBC system creates certainty as well, by generating parameters
within which all parties can work, while also constructing a mechanism (the
commission) by which adjustments can be made depending on
circumstances. 25
Finally, the use of condemnation provisions 26 allows the commission
to achieve pure K-H efficiency. Those users that must be supplanted by
projects deemed essential by the commission can be compensated for their
loss subject to federal and state condemnation laws. While these
condemnation actions may be subject to takings criticism, economic
efficiency requires that if a resource can be put to a better use, it should.
Economic efficiency is especially vital when a scarce resource like water is
involved.
CONCLUSION
The Southeastern Water Compact marks an important step in the
development of the Chattahoochee/Apalachiola River basin. Growth comes
2 See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
2'3 See supra text accompanying note 209.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
225 See Erhardt, supra note 1, at 225; see also Muys, supra note 113, at 316-18.
226 See supra text accompanying note 210.
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at a price, however. In the case of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia that price
is the potential scarcity of water resources in the basin. Water is a resource
that has historically been vehemently fought over and this case is no different.
Southern states were faced with three potential choices for dealing
with the dispute: congressional apportionment, judicial apportionment, or the
use of an interstate compact. Though Alabama originally intended to resort
to the Supreme Court for a remedy to the dispute over the "Hooch," it
realized the dangers of such a solution and turned, along with all the parties,
to the compact system. The choice now facing the parties is exactly which
system to follow. There are three possible approaches: the Colorado River
Compact, the Upper Colorado River Compact/Rio Grande Compact, or the
Delaware River Basin Compact. Each has its merits, but the failure of the
first two types of compacts to include the federal government as a party
makes them less attractive in terms of true economic efficiency.
What remains is the solution proposed by the Delaware River Basin
Compact. Such a compact would provide Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the
federal government with a means to properly deal with allocation of water
rights in the Chattahoochee/Apalachiola river basin. Though not flawless, the
DRBC Model comes closest to true economic efficiency by ensuring that
resources are initially divided according to economic use, while allowing
flexibility to long-term apportionment-all at relatively low transaction costs.
Normative economic analysis steers rational policy makers away from
the Colorado/Rio Grande models, while positive economic analysis
illuminates the advantages and possible trade-offs that must be made by
choosing the DRBC. Wherever the parties in the dispute over the "Hooch"
ultimately end up, it is safe to say that the states at least have taken a step
towards achieving the law and economics goal of efficiency by choosing the
compact route.
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